Single Instant Payment — API Guide 14 min read

Before implementing Single Instant Payment, ensure the following are in place:

• API Hub onboarded — Your API Hub instance is provisioned and your environment-specific configuration is complete.
• Enc1 key pair generated and registered — The TPP encrypts PII to your LFI's Enc1 public key. Your LFI MUST hold the corresponding private key and be able to look it up by kid.
• Consent Journey implemented — The Consent Journey API Guide MUST be implemented first. A payment cannot be initiated without an authorized consent.
• Ozone Connect connectivity verified — Bidirectional mTLS connectivity is confirmed between the API Hub and your Ozone Connect base URL. See Connectivity & Certificates.
• Single Instant Payment advertised — ApiMetadata.SingleInstantPayment.Supported is set to true on your authorisation server entry in the Trust Framework.

When a TPP creates a payment consent, the API Hub calls your POST/consent/action/validate endpoint before the consent is created. Your LFI MUST validate the consent and respond with data.status: "valid" or data.status: "invalid". An invalid response prevents the consent being created and the TPP receives an error.

The full set of validation rules — standardVersion, Initiation.DebtorAccount, BaseConsentId, CurrencyRequest, payment-type support, PII conformance, creditor checks — is enumerated in Single Instant Payment Requirements — Consent Validation. The two parts that need a code walkthrough are decrypting the PII and validating the creditor; both are covered below.

Decrypting and validating the PII

The consent.PersonalIdentifiableInformation field arrives as a JWE compact string encrypted by the TPP to your LFI's Enc1 public key. The API Hub passes it through unchanged — it cannot inspect the contents and has not validated them. Decryption, schema validation, and field-level checks are entirely the LFI's responsibility.

The end-to-end flow is:

• Read the kid from the JWE protected header and look up the matching Enc1 private key.
• Decrypt the JWE → recover the inner JWS.
• Decode the JWS payload (signature verification is optional — the outer Ozone Connect request is itself a JWS that the API Hub has already verified, so the PII cannot have been tampered with in transit).
• Validate the decoded payload against the consent-time PII schema — AEBankServiceInitiationRichAuthorizationRequests.AEDomesticPaymentPII in uae-api-hub-consent-manager-openapi.yaml. additionalProperties: false is set at every level, so any unexpected field fails validation.

Happy-path snippet:

import { compactDecrypt, importPKCS8, decodeJwt } from 'jose'

async function decryptAndValidateConsentPII(
  piiJwe: string
): Promise<Record<string, unknown>> {
  // 1. kid → private key
  const [headerB64] = piiJwe.split('.')
  const { kid } = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(headerB64, 'base64url').toString())
  const privateKey = await importPKCS8(
    enc1KeyStore.getPrivateKeyPem(kid),
    'RSA-OAEP-256'
  )

  // 2. JWE → JWS
  const { plaintext } = await compactDecrypt(piiJwe, privateKey)

  // 3. JWS → payload (signature verification is optional)
  const pii = decodeJwt(new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext))

  // 4. Schema validation against AEDomesticPaymentPII
  validateConsentPiiSchema(pii)

  return pii
}

For the per-step deep dive — kid lookup conventions, key import options, the optional JWS signature verification, building the ajv / jsonschema validator with all $ref schemas registered — see How to Decrypt PII.

The decrypted consent-time PII for a Single Instant Payment looks like:

{
  "Initiation": {
    "Creditor": [
      {
        "CreditorAccount": {
          "SchemeName": "IBAN",
          "Identification": "AE220331234567890876543",
          "Name": { "en": "Fatima Al Zaabi" }
        },
        "CreditorAgent": {
          "SchemeName": "BICFI",
          "Identification": "BARBAEAAXXX"
        }
      }
    ],
    "DebtorAccount": {
      "SchemeName": "IBAN",
      "Identification": "AE070331234567890123456"
    }
  },
  "Risk": {
    "PaymentContextCode": "EcommerceGoods",
    "MerchantCategoryCode": "5411"
  },
  "iat": 1745020800,
  "exp": 1745021100,
  "iss": "tpp-client-id"
}

If decryption fails, schema validation fails, or any required field is missing, respond with invalid per Rejecting an invalid consent.

Validating the Creditor

For Single Instant Payment, Initiation.Creditor MUST be an array of exactly one entry. The full Creditor rules — cardinality, mandatory fields, BIC derivation — are in Creditor. This section walks through the validation in code.

The validation breaks into four parts:

• Cardinality — exactly one entry.
• Mandatory fields — CreditorAccount.SchemeName == "IBAN", Identification is a syntactically valid UAE IBAN, at least one of Name.en or Name.ar is present.
• BIC consistency — derive the BIC from the IBAN; if CreditorAgent.Identification was supplied it MUST match.
• Domestic rail reachability — the receiving bank is reachable on AANI or UAEFTS, and (where the LFI can determine it) the receiving account is in a state that can accept a payment.

Steps 1–3 are universal. Step 4 depends on each LFI's BIC directory and rail integration — the snippet below uses a stubbed lookupRailReachability(bic) interface that your LFI replaces with its own implementation.

function isValidUaeIban(iban: string): boolean {
  // UAE IBAN: AE + 21 digits = 23 chars
  if (!/^AE\d{21}$/.test(iban)) return false
  // ISO 13616 mod-97 check
  const rearranged = iban.slice(4) + iban.slice(0, 4)
  const numeric = rearranged
    .split('')
    .map(c => (/[A-Z]/.test(c) ? (c.charCodeAt(0) - 55).toString() : c))
    .join('')
  let remainder = 0
  for (const digit of numeric) {
    remainder = (remainder * 10 + Number(digit)) % 97
  }
  return remainder === 1
}

function deriveBicFromIban(iban: string): string {
  // UAE IBAN positions 5-7 (0-indexed 4-6) carry the bank code.
  // Resolve it to a BIC via the LFI's domestic BIC directory.
  return bicDirectory.lookupByUaeBankCode(iban.slice(4, 7))
}

interface InvalidResponse { status: 'invalid'; code: string; description: string }

async function validateCreditor(
  creditor: Array<{
    CreditorAccount: {
      SchemeName: string
      Identification: string
      Name?: { en?: string; ar?: string }
    }
    CreditorAgent?: { SchemeName: string; Identification: string }
  }>
): Promise<InvalidResponse | null> {
  // 1. Cardinality
  if (!Array.isArray(creditor) || creditor.length !== 1) {
    return invalid('InvalidCreditor',
      'Single Instant Payment requires exactly one creditor entry.')
  }
  const c = creditor[0]

  // 2. Mandatory fields
  if (c.CreditorAccount.SchemeName !== 'IBAN') {
    return invalid('InvalidCreditor',
      'CreditorAccount.SchemeName MUST be "IBAN" for domestic payments.')
  }
  if (!isValidUaeIban(c.CreditorAccount.Identification)) {
    return invalid('InvalidCreditor',
      'CreditorAccount.Identification is not a valid UAE IBAN.')
  }
  if (!c.CreditorAccount.Name?.en && !c.CreditorAccount.Name?.ar) {
    return invalid('InvalidCreditor',
      'CreditorAccount.Name MUST include at least one of `en` or `ar`.')
  }

  // 3. BIC consistency
  const derivedBic = deriveBicFromIban(c.CreditorAccount.Identification)
  if (c.CreditorAgent?.Identification && c.CreditorAgent.Identification !== derivedBic) {
    return invalid('InvalidCreditor',
      'CreditorAgent.Identification does not match the BIC derived from the IBAN.')
  }

  // 4. Domestic rail reachability + receiving account state
  const r = await lookupRailReachability(derivedBic)
  if (!r.reachableOnAani && !r.reachableOnUaefts) {
    return invalid('UnreachableCreditorAccount',
      'Creditor bank is not reachable on AANI or UAEFTS.')
  }
  if (r.canDetermineAccountState && !r.accountCanReceive) {
    return invalid('UnreachableCreditorAccount',
      'Creditor account cannot currently receive payments.')
  }

  return null
}

const invalid = (code: string, description: string): InvalidResponse =>
  ({ status: 'invalid', code, description })

Validating the DebtorAccount

If the TPP supplied Initiation.DebtorAccount in the consent PII, your LFI MUST also validate it before approving the consent: SchemeName is IBAN, the IBAN corresponds to an account held at this LFI and reachable through this API Hub integration, and the account is in a state that permits payment initiation (not blocked, dormant, or closed). Customer ownership of the account is not checked here — it is checked later during the authorisation journey, once the customer has authenticated.

The full check list and the invalid response shape (with code: InvalidDebtorAccount) are in Debtor Account.

Returning the validate response

If validateCreditor (or the DebtorAccount checks) returns a non-null result, return it inside data on the validate response:

{
  "data": {
    "status": "invalid",
    "code": "InvalidCreditor",
    "description": "CreditorAccount.Identification is not a valid UAE IBAN."
  },
  "meta": {}
}

See Consent Events & Actions — API Guide for the full validate request and response schema.

POST/payments is the central endpoint your LFI implements for payment execution. The API Hub calls it after a TPP payment instruction has passed all Hub-side validations. Your LFI MUST decrypt and validate the PII, match it against the consent, run the synchronous validations listed in POST /payments Requirements, create the payment record, and return 201 with the assigned PaymentId.

Screening, rail submission, and status propagation happen after the 201 response — see After returning 201. The payment MUST be submitted to the rail within 3 seconds of returning the 201 — see Payment Timing.

Common request headers

Request body

Content-Type: application/json

The Hub sends a plain JSON payload (not a JWS) containing the payment details, the headers the TPP supplied, and the TPP's directory record.

Top-level fields

request.Data

For the full schema — including tpp and decodedSsa field-by-field — see the POST /payments API Reference.

Request example

{
  "requestUrl": "https://rs1.[LFICode].apihub.openfinance.ae/open-finance/payment/v2.2/payments",
  "paymentType": "cbuae-payment",
  "request": {
    "Data": {
      "ConsentId": "cac2381a-7111-4c5f-bc2f-4319a93da7c5",
      "Instruction": {
        "Amount": { "Amount": "100.00", "Currency": "AED" }
      },
      "PaymentPurposeCode": "ACM",
      "PersonalIdentifiableInformation": "eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUC0yNTYi...",
      "OpenFinanceBilling": { "Type": "Collection" }
    }
  },
  "requestHeaders": {
    "o3-provider-id": "lfi-123",
    "o3-caller-org-id": "tpp-456",
    "o3-caller-client-id": "client-789",
    "o3-api-uri": "/open-finance/payment/v2.2/payments",
    "o3-api-operation": "POST",
    "o3-ozone-interaction-id": "ozone-xyz",
    "o3-consent-id": "cac2381a-7111-4c5f-bc2f-4319a93da7c5",
    "o3-psu-identifier": "eyJwczoi...",
    "x-fapi-interaction-id": "0f4d3a16-9e27-4f8d-9a5a-3a2f7e9c1b22",
    "x-fapi-auth-date": "Tue, 18 Apr 2026 10:14:22 GMT",
    "x-fapi-customer-ip-address": "192.0.2.45",
    "x-idempotency-key": "idem-2026-04-18-001"
  },
  "tpp": {
    "clientId": "1675793e-d6e3-4954-96c8-acb9aaa83c53",
    "orgId": "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef0123456789",
    "tppId": "fdd6e0ac-ba7a-4bc4-a986-c45c5daaaf00",
    "tppName": "Example TPP",
    "softwareStatementId": "XvAjPeeYZAdWwrFF..",
    "decodedSsa": {
      "client_id": "1675793e-d6e3-4954-96c8-acb9aaa83c53",
      "client_name": "Example TPP",
      "roles": ["BSIP"]
    }
  },
  "supplementaryInformation": {}
}

Reading the PII at payment time

The payment-time PII follows a different shape from the consent-time PII:

• Initiation.Creditor is a single object, not an array — the consent fixed exactly one creditor at consent time.
• DebtorAccount is absent — the debtor was selected and pinned during consent authorisation.
• The schema to validate against is AEBankServiceInitiation.AEDomesticPaymentPIIProperties in uae-ozone-connect-bank-service-initiation-openapi.yaml — not the consent-time schema.

The decrypt + decode flow is identical to consent time — read the kid, decrypt with the matching Enc1 private key, decode the JWS payload. Re-use the helper from Decrypting and validating the PII; only swap the schema:

async function decryptAndValidatePaymentPII(piiJwe: string) {
  const pii = await decryptPii(piiJwe) // shared decrypt helper
  validatePaymentPiiSchema(pii)         // AEDomesticPaymentPIIProperties
  return pii
}

If decryption fails, reject with 400 JWE.DecryptionError. If schema validation fails (missing required field, wrong type, additional property), reject with 400 Body.InvalidFormat.

Matching the PII against the consent

Per POST /payments Requirements rule 2, the submitted creditor at payment time MUST exactly match the single creditor entry that was on the consent at consent time. Mismatch → 400 Consent.FailsControlParameters.

The link between the payment and the consent is the o3-consent-id request header (also surfaced as request.Data.ConsentId in the body). Two implementation patterns are valid; pick whichever matches your LFI's persistence model:

Pattern A — LFI persisted the decrypted creditor at consent time

The most common pattern. At consent validation, after you decrypted and validated the consent-time PII, you persisted the single creditor entry keyed by consentId. At payment time you fetch it and deep-compare against the payment-time creditor.

async function matchPaymentCreditorToConsent(
  consentId: string,
  paymentPii: { Initiation: { Creditor: ConsentTimeCreditor } }
): Promise<void> {
  const consentCreditor = await consentStore.getCreditor(consentId)
  if (!consentCreditor) {
    throw httpError(400, 'Consent.Invalid', `No stored consent for ${consentId}.`)
  }

  if (!isExactMatch(consentCreditor, paymentPii.Initiation.Creditor)) {
    throw httpError(400, 'Consent.FailsControlParameters',
      'Payment creditor does not match the creditor authorised on the consent.')
  }
}

function isExactMatch(consentCreditor: any, paymentCreditor: any): boolean {
  // Compare every field that was authorised — case-sensitive.
  // CreditorAccount: SchemeName, Identification, Name.en, Name.ar
  // CreditorAgent (if present on the consent): SchemeName, Identification
  return (
    consentCreditor.CreditorAccount.SchemeName === paymentCreditor.CreditorAccount.SchemeName &&
    consentCreditor.CreditorAccount.Identification === paymentCreditor.CreditorAccount.Identification &&
    consentCreditor.CreditorAccount.Name?.en === paymentCreditor.CreditorAccount.Name?.en &&
    consentCreditor.CreditorAccount.Name?.ar === paymentCreditor.CreditorAccount.Name?.ar &&
    consentCreditor.CreditorAgent?.SchemeName === paymentCreditor.CreditorAgent?.SchemeName &&
    consentCreditor.CreditorAgent?.Identification === paymentCreditor.CreditorAgent?.Identification
  )
}

Pattern B — LFI did not persist the consent-time PII

If your LFI did not persist the decrypted PII at consent time, fetch the consent from the API Hub via GET/consents/{consentId}, decrypt the consent's PersonalIdentifiableInformation field, and run the same isExactMatch comparison against Initiation.Creditor[0] (the consent-time creditor is an array of one).

Pattern B trades a stored creditor for a network round-trip and a second decryption on every payment. Choose Pattern A unless persistence is not an option for your LFI.

Reading the FAPI customer headers

The TPP's FAPI headers (x-fapi-customer-ip-address, x-fapi-auth-date, x-fapi-interaction-id, x-customer-user-agent, x-idempotency-key) are forwarded inside body.requestHeaders — they are not on the actual HTTP headers of the API Hub → LFI call. Read them off the body.

Per POST /payments Requirements rule 3, x-fapi-customer-ip-address MUST be present on a Single Instant Payment (the customer is actively present at the time of the call) and MUST be a valid IPv4 or IPv6 address. Missing or malformed → 400 Body.InvalidFormat.

import net from 'node:net'

function readCustomerIpAddress(body: { requestHeaders: Record<string, string> }): string {
  const ip = body.requestHeaders['x-fapi-customer-ip-address']
  if (!ip || net.isIP(ip) === 0) {
    throw httpError(400, 'Body.InvalidFormat',
      'x-fapi-customer-ip-address is missing or not a valid IPv4/IPv6 address.')
  }
  return ip
}

The validated IP is typically logged on the payment record and surfaced to fraud and screening systems alongside x-fapi-auth-date and x-customer-user-agent.

Response

Content-Type: application/json

Return 201 on successful payment record creation.

Example — successful initiation

{
  "data": {
    "id": "5ff155ea-853f-480c-ac74-1eaed7c1201f",
    "consentId": "cac2381a-7111-4c5f-bc2f-4319a93da7c5",
    "status": "Pending",
    "statusUpdateDateTime": "2026-04-18T10:14:23Z",
    "creationDateTime": "2026-04-18T10:14:23Z",
    "instruction": {
      "Amount": { "amount": "100.00", "currency": "AED" }
    },
    "paymentPurposeCode": "ACM",
    "openFinanceBilling": { "Type": "Collection" }
  },
  "meta": {}
}

Error responses

Only return an error when the request is invalid or a server condition prevents you from responding. All error bodies MUST include errorCode and errorMessage. The errorCode values are drawn from the POST /payments OpenAPI schema Error400 / Error403 enums.

400 — Bad request

403 — Forbidden

409 / 500

409 for conflict conditions and 500 for transient/unrecoverable server errors. Use GenericRecoverableError if the Hub may retry, GenericError otherwise.

504 — Gateway Timeout

You MAY return 504 when you cannot complete processing within your internal time limit. The API Hub treats it as a timeout. The body for this status is not standardised and no schema is defined for it. A 504 is a 5xx response, so it counts as a failed request under the Ozone Connect Availability Policy.

Example error response

{
  "errorCode": "Consent.FailsControlParameters",
  "errorMessage": "Payment creditor does not match the creditor authorised on the consent."
}

After returning 201

The 201 returned to the API Hub means the payment record exists at your LFI; it does not mean the payment has settled. The lifecycle from here is asynchronous and is the LFI's responsibility:

Routing with UseFTS

The TPP may set UseFTS on the payment request to require settlement over UAEFTS. The API Hub passes the value through as request.Data.UseFTS. Route the payment as follows:

PATCH delivery is durable: retry transient 5xx/timeout failures with exponential backoff; raise 4xx failures for operational investigation rather than retrying.

Backs the TPP request GET https://rs1.LFICODE.apihub.openfinance.ae/open-finance/payment/v2.2/payments/{PaymentId}.

Returns the current state of a payment your LFI created via POST/payments. The TPP polls this to observe screening outcomes, rail settlement, and any subsequent rejection.

Request headers

See Common request headers.

Path parameters

Response

Content-Type: application/json

The response shape mirrors the POST/payments 201 response — same data envelope, with the current Status, paymentTransactionId (once set), and any rejection details.

{
  "data": {
    "id": "5ff155ea-853f-480c-ac74-1eaed7c1201f",
    "consentId": "cac2381a-7111-4c5f-bc2f-4319a93da7c5",
    "paymentTransactionId": "OFP7d2c1e9a4b6f4c0e8a1b",
    "status": "AcceptedSettlementCompleted",
    "statusUpdateDateTime": "2026-04-18T10:14:25Z",
    "creationDateTime": "2026-04-18T10:14:23Z",
    "instruction": {
      "Amount": { "amount": "100.00", "currency": "AED" }
    },
    "paymentPurposeCode": "ACM",
    "openFinanceBilling": { "Type": "Collection" }
  },
  "meta": {}
}

Behavioural rules

Per GET /payments/{paymentId} Requirements:

// Answer GET /payments/{paymentId} from the API Hub payment log.
// `cm.get` is your Consent Manager client: the same connection your LFI uses
// for PATCH /payment-log/{id}. It returns the parsed JSON body.

const PAGE_SIZE = 25

async function findLogEntry(consentId: string, paymentId: string) {
  for (let page = 1; ; page++) {
    const log = await cm.get(
      `/payment-log?consentId=${encodeURIComponent(consentId)}&page=${page}&pageSize=${PAGE_SIZE}`,
    )
    const entry = log.data.find((e) => e.paymentId === paymentId)
    if (entry) return entry
    if (log.data.length < PAGE_SIZE) return null
  }
}

// Fields copied from paymentResponse only when present, so an absent field is
// omitted rather than sent empty.
const OPTIONAL = ['paymentTransactionId', 'rejectReasonCode', 'instruction', 'debtorReference', 'openFinanceBilling']

async function getPayment(headers: Record<string, string>, paymentId: string) {
  const entry = await findLogEntry(headers['o3-consent-id'], paymentId)
  if (!entry) return null // 404 Resource.NotFound

  const p = entry.paymentResponse
  const data: Record<string, any> = {
    id: entry.paymentId,
    consentId: entry.consentId,
    status: p.status,
    statusUpdateDateTime: p.statusUpdateDateTime,
    creationDateTime: p.creationDateTime,
    paymentPurposeCode: p.paymentPurposeCode,
  }
  for (const key of OPTIONAL) if (p[key] !== undefined) data[key] = p[key]

  return { data, meta: {} }
}

Errors

See the GET /payments/{paymentId} API Reference for the full schema.